Can Crypto Upgrade Before Quantum Computers Arrive?
Ethereum and Bitcoin developers are building quantum-resistant upgrades, but replacing vulnerable signatures is only part of the challenge. Migrating exposed keys, legacy wallets and inaccessible coins may prove harder than the cryptography itself.

In a lengthy post on X on November 16, Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin publicly reversed his earlier skepticism toward leanPCS, a cryptographic technique being explored to make post-quantum verification more efficient.
“Over the past few weeks I've gone from thinking leanPCS is total bull to being a total bull.”
Ethereum has been investigating how to replace digital signatures vulnerable to quantum attacks with quantum-resistant alternatives. While a conventional Ethereum signature occupies approximately 65 bytes, some post-quantum alternatives require thousands of bytes and substantially more computing resources to verify. Across millions of transactions, those additional requirements add up. Buterin has called putting data of that size on chain unsustainable.
In June 2026, Buterin and Thomas Coratger co-authored Ethereum Improvement Proposal 8288 (EIP-8288), which proposes combining large numbers of signatures and cryptographic proofs into a single proof to reduce verification costs.
According to the proposal, directly verifying certain quantum-resistant signatures could cost between 150,000 and 200,000 gas, Ethereum's unit for measuring computational work. EIP-8288 remains a draft and has not been implemented on Ethereum's mainnet.
In his November 16 post on X, Buterin identified leanPCS as a potential path for EIP-8288, in which users would submit PCS openings (proofs that a committed polynomial produces a claimed value) rather than full STARKs. leanPCS is less efficient onchain than leanSTARK, because proving one statement requires multiple claims.
However, leanSTARK would require Ethereum developers to agree on an instruction set architecture (ISA), the language in which users write the programs being proven, a decision that could take considerable time. leanPCS requires only agreement on a mathematical field, potentially allowing it to be implemented sooner. In the same post, Buterin said it offers “the same generality as leanSTARK, in a way that could potentially be implemented very quickly.”
leanPCS is not currently specified in the EIP-8288 draft, which also depends on EIP-8141, a separate proposal introducing the transaction frames needed for its implementation. Neither proposal has an announced deployment timeline.
The quantum threat extends beyond Ethereum. Cryptocurrency networks such as Bitcoin and Ethereum rely on public-key cryptography to authorize transactions. This system uses two mathematically linked keys: a public key that can be shared and a private key that must remain secret. A quantum computing algorithm known as Shor's algorithm, developed in 1994, could allow a sufficiently powerful quantum computer to derive a private key from its corresponding public key, potentially enabling unauthorized transactions.
Quantum computers capable of breaking deployed Bitcoin or Ethereum signatures have not been publicly demonstrated. Nevertheless, developing and deploying replacements may take years, especially when existing wallets and assets must migrate.
The potential exposure is substantial. According to Glassnode data as of November 10, approximately 7.12 million BTC, representing 35.4% of Bitcoin's supply, is associated with publicly exposed cryptographic keys. In its Ethereum Risq List, launched October 30, post-quantum security company Project Eleven estimated that 88.1 million ETH, approximately 72% of Ethereum's supply, is associated with exposed keys. The two estimates use different methodologies, and neither means the assets can be stolen today. Together, they illustrate the scale of the potential migration challenge.
Bitcoin developers are exploring their own approaches to the quantum threat. Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 360 (BIP-360) introduces a new output structure intended to reduce exposure to quantum attacks, while BIP-361 proposes a multiyear transition that would first restrict sending funds to certain vulnerable output types and later restrict spending through older signature methods. Both proposals remain drafts with no announced activation timeline, and BIP-361 would require a post-quantum output type to be implemented before its proposed migration restrictions could take effect.
However, not all bitcoin can necessarily be migrated. Some private keys have been lost, leaving their associated coins inaccessible to their original owners. If quantum computers eventually become powerful enough to recover private keys from exposed public keys, those coins could become vulnerable to theft.
At Devcon on November 4, Ethereum researcher Justin Drake reportedly said Bitcoin could eventually restrict spending of vulnerable coins, potentially including some holdings attributed to Bitcoin's pseudonymous creator, Satoshi Nakamoto. Estimates of coins attributed to Satoshi range from roughly 1 million to 1.1 million BTC.
A defensive restriction could protect vulnerable coins from quantum theft, but it could also prevent legitimate owners from accessing assets they have held for years. Conversely, leaving those coins accessible under quantum-vulnerable rules could allow attackers to acquire funds without knowing the original owners' private keys.
The cryptographic tools needed to protect cryptocurrency from quantum computers are already being developed. Whether Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other networks can deploy them before they are needed remains uncertain. And for assets whose owners cannot migrate to new security standards, the question may ultimately be less about what the technology permits than what decentralized communities are willing to change.
Sources
CoinDesk: Buterin backs a faster route to quantum-safe Ethereum
Peter Shor, “Algorithms for Quantum Computation: Discrete Logarithms and Factoring,” Proceedings of the 35th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 1994.
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